The recent UK riots generated much
discussion but little consensus. Useful qualitative analysis (e.g.,
Rowntree, 2011) of attitudes of those involved constitutes only foreground,
proximate explanations of behaviour. Violence is typically seen as anti-social but
actually, much rioting was highly pro-social. Coalitions were formed and new
outgroups and ingroups established--even overcoming gang enmities. The use of
new media such as Blackberries to aid in this, this should not obscure the fact
that coalitional violence is an ancient facultative strategy. Analysis drawing
on behavioural ecology foraging and coalitional models sees violence as
facultative when the potential trade-offs, low risk versus high reward, are
sufficient. Using these insights we analyse data from the recent riots drawn
from arrest, background and sentencing reports. We show that--as standard
evolutionary theory relating to life history strategy predicts--risk-taking
behaviours make sense against a background of cues to highly unequal life-history outcomes. Implications to policy
makers—such as reducing such cues are discussed. For example, while increasing
potential costs of riotous behaviour through highly punitive responses may work
to some extent--this will carry costs of its own--especially if this
contributes towards background cues of unfairness that drive such behaviour.