Peer-Reviewed Journal Details
Mandatory Fields
Salice, Alessandro
2020
November
Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy
The Phenomenality and Intentional Structure of We-Experiences
Published
Optional Fields
We-experience Self-representation Subjective character Phenomenal consciousness Constitution
When you and I share an experience, each of us lives through a we-experience. The paper claims that we-experiences have unique phenomenality and structure. First, we-experiencesí phenomenality is characterised by the fact that they feel like ours to their subject. This specific phenomenality is contended to derive from the way these experiences self-represent: a we-experience exemplifies us-ness or togetherness because it self-represents as mine qua ours. Second, living through a we-experience together with somebody else is not to have this experience in parallel with the experience of the other. Rather, the paper argues that a we-experience is partly co-constituted by the experience of the other. After offering an account of the phenomenality and constitution of we-experiences, which traces these two elements back to the subjectís self-understanding as a group member, the paper argues for the claim that an experienceís for-us-ness is committal to this experience being co-constituted by another we-experience.
1572-8749
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-020-09727-w
10.1007/s11245-020-09727-w
Grant Details